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FEATURE COMMENT: The Draft OCI
Rule—New Directions And The History Of
Fear
After years of rancor and debate, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the FAR Councils have
finally issued a proposed revision to the regulations governing organizational conflict of interests
(OCIs) in federal procurement. 76 Fed. Reg. 23236
(April 26, 2011). The proposed rule marks an extraordinary change of direction—in some ways, it
reorders policy priorities built up over years of case
law—and may reflect, in many ways, the drafters’
nagging ambivalence about the new direction. The
drafters should take heart, though: the proposed
rule generally marks a healthy new course, a strong
step forward in rules that will likely continue to
evolve for many decades to come.
A Brief History of OCI Regulation in the
U.S. Federal System—The law regarding OCIs
in the U.S. federal procurement system is, in
many ways, among the most sophisticated in the
world. While prohibitions against what we call
OCIs emerge in procurement regimes around the
world, including the European Union, see Directive 2004/18/EC, prefatory para. (8) (2004), and the
World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement, see GPA Art. VI.4 (1994), the
OCI rules that have evolved in our federal system
seem, in many ways, the most elaborated. The new
directions that the proposed rule marks may, therefore, serve as guideposts for future reforms abroad.
Although the foreign laws governing OCIs typically focus on contractors that may help write distorted specifications to gain an improper competitive edge in a future procurement—what we will
4-092-387-4

call “biased ground rules” OCIs—the original U.S.
OCI rules in the early 1960s grew out of a different,
more amorphous fear. The concern then was that
large weapon system integrators, which dominated
the military-industrial complex at that time, would
control competitions by controlling critical design
information—that they would gain “unequal access
to information,” due to inside information. See Taylor, “Organizational Conflicts of Interest/Edition II,”
Briefing Papers No. 84-08, at 1 & n.7 (August 1984)
(citing authorities).
As the OCI rules were codified in the new Federal Acquisition Regulation in 1984, see 48 Fed. Reg.
42102, 42152 (1983), the new FAR provisions, based
on the previous guidance used by the Department
of Defense, see 45 Fed. Reg. 51253 (1980); Taylor,
“Organizational Conflicts of Interest in Defense
Contracting,” 14 Pub. Cont. L.J. 158 (1983), took a
relatively conservative approach and, among other
things, did not impose postaward OCI disclosure
obligations on contractors. See Taylor and Dickson,
“Organizational Conflicts of Interest Under the
Federal Acquisition Regulation,” 15 Pub. Cont. L.J.
107, 111–12 (1984) (citing authorities). The FAR
provisions were made part of FAR pt. 9, which
governs determinations of contractor qualifications
(“responsibility” in the U.S. system) before contract
award. See FAR 9.100; see, e.g., Madden, Pavlick
and Worrall, “Organizational Conflicts of Interest/
Edition III,” Briefing Papers No. 94-08, at 3 (July
1994). While the 1984 FAR provisions extended the
scope of OCI review, the core concern remained preaward, to ensure fair competition. See, e.g., Taylor,
supra, Briefing Papers No. 84-08, at 2.
In the following years, much of the OCI regulatory regime was written by the General Accounting
Office (later the Government Accountability Office),
in its decisions on bid protests. See generally Szeliga, “Conflict and Intrigue in Government Contracts:
A Guide to Identifying and Mitigating Organizational Conflicts of Interest,” 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 639
(2006) (discussing authorities). The seminal GAO
decision was Aetna Gov’t Health Plans, Inc., Comp.
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Gen. Dec. B-254397 et al., 95-2 CPD ¶ 129 (1995);
see Cantu, “Organizational Conflicts of Interest/
Edition IV,” Briefing Papers No. 06-12, at 1 (November 2006), a 1995 decision drafted by Daniel Gordon,
who now—in an interesting historical twist—heads
OFPP. GAO’s decision in Aetna tried to make sense
of the OCI regulations by identifying three distinct
types of OCIs:
s h5NEQUAL ACCESS TO INFORMATIONv /#)S WHICH
arise when a firm has access to non-public information that can lead to a competitive advantage
in a later procurement.
s h"IASED GROUND RULESv /#)S WHICH ARISE WHEN A
firm, as part of “its performance of a government
contract, has in some sense set the ground rules
for another government contract by, for example,
writing the statement of work or specification.”
s h)MPAIRED OBJECTIVITYv /#)S WHICH ARISE WHEN
A CONTRACT REQUIRES THE EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT BY
the contracting firm, and the economic interests
of the firm may distort the free and unbiased
EXERCISE OF THAT JUDGMENT
Aetna, at 8–9; Cantu, supra, at 1–2; FAR subpt. 9.5.
Of the three types of OCIs identified in Aetna,
THE IMPAIRED OBJECTIVITY /#)S APPEARED TO TRIGGER
the most concern at GAO. This seemed, in part, due
TO THE FACT THAT hIMPAIRED OBJECTIVITY /#)S ARE THE
most difficult to identify because they are not limited
to the contract itself; rather, they depend on whether
THE CONTRACTORS JUDGMENT COULD BE AFFECTED BY ACTIVIties not related to the contract.” Bartley, “Too Big to
Mitigate? The Rise of Organizational Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management,” 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. 531,
539 (2011); see Gordon, “Organizational Conflicts of
Interest: A Growing Integrity Challenge,” 35 Pub.
Cont. L.J. 25 (2005). That difficulty of monitoring
potential conflicts, plus a deeper fear that contractors were penetrating too deeply into Government
decision-making, helped to launch a series of decisions at GAO sustaining protests based on “impaired
OBJECTIVITYv
7HAT STOOD OUT IN THESE IMPAIRED OBJECTIVITY
cases was GAO’s general unwillingness to accept
the affected contractors’ arguments that, by erecting
firewalls (procedures and physical security measures
intended to block the flow of information), the contractors could eliminate the bias that might infect their
OBJECTIVE ADVICE TO THE 'OVERNMENT 3EE EG 'ORDON
SUPRA AT n h7HERE AN @IMPAIRED OBJECTIVITY /#)
is at issue, it is difficult to see how a firewall within
2

the conflicted organization would mitigate the OCI,
in light of the assumption in these OCIs that all employees of the organization will work to further the
organization’s interest.”); Bartley, supra, at 541 n.64
(“GAO has held that a firewall ‘is virtually irrelevant
TO AN ;/#)= INVOLVING POTENTIALLY IMPAIRED OBJECTIVITY
” (citing authorities)).
4HAT FEAR THAT CONTRACTORS JUDGMENT WOULD BE
corrupted, and the broader bulk of GAO precedent
on OCIs, played an important part in shaping DOD’s
draft revision of the OCI provisions in the Defense
FAR Supplement, which DOD published in April
2010. 75 Fed. Reg. 20954 (April 22, 2010). The draft
DFARS rule carried forward that fear of corrupted
CONTRACTOR JUDGMENTS AND MADE IT CLEAR THAT lREwalls, standing alone, could not resolve impaired
OBJECTIVITY /#)S )D A hlREWALL BY ITSELF WITHOUT
any additional mitigation actions, is appropriate to
resolve only ‘unfair access to non-public information’
organizational conflicts of interest”).
Shortly after the draft DFARS rule was published, however, a new consensus began to emerge.
The draft DFARS rule was heavily criticized by senior
members of the procurement bar, in part because the
DFARS rule in many ways simply codified the GAO
case law on OCIs. There was, in other words, support
for a new way forward.
Proposed OCI Rule—The final DFARS rule set
the stage for the latest draft rule, which would apply
Government-wide. Recognizing that a new consensus
was emerging, the drafters of the DFARS rule cut
BACK ITS SCOPE TO MAKE IT APPLICABLE ONLY TO MAJOR
weapon system procurements by DOD. 75 Fed. Reg.
81908 (Dec. 29, 2010). Although there was statutory
authority for this narrower approach—the enabling
statute had, in fact, called only for rules governing
weapon system procurement—DOD’s decision to
retrench suggested that the Government-wide rule,
when it emerged, would take a very different approach. The proposed OCI rule published last week
proved that forecast correct.
The key elements of the proposed rule are set
forth in accompanying Table 1. Some of the more
interesting aspects of the proposed rule:
s !N !PPARENT !MBIVALENCE The prefatory
comments suggest deep ambivalence about the
rule’s new direction. The drafters ignore the
final DFARS rule, and instead suggest that the
original proposed DFARS rule—which tracked
GAO’s case law—offers an approach as valid
The Government Contractor © 2011 Thomson Reuters
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as the draft Government-wide OCI rule. As a
practical matter, however, now that OFPP and
the FAR Councils have staked out a position
that at least seems an evolutionary step beyond
the DFARS draft rule, it will be difficult for the
drafters of the Government-wide OCI rule to
reverse direction, to retreat to the more “traditional” position in the proposed DFARS rule.
s 2ULE 2EMOVED TO 0ART  Following the lead
of the DFARS drafters, the FAR Councils and
OFPP would move the Government-wide OCI
rule from FAR pt. 9 (contractor qualification) to
pt. 3 (improper business practices). This remains
a puzzling and internally conflicted decision. On
one hand, the move reflects a rough assumption

that OCIs, like personal conflicts of interest,
should be dealt with under FAR pt. 3, where
other anticorruption measures appear. On the
other hand, the thrust of the proposed rule is
that OCIs are not necessarily corrupt—in fact,
as is discussed below, under certain circumstances a contracting officer may decide that
the risks an OCI poses are marginal compared
to the benefits of using a particular contractor.
s /#)S ,IKELY $EALT WITH AS -ATTERS OF #ONTRACTOR 1UALIlCATION Another reason to move
the OCI provisions back to FAR pt. 9 is that, as
a practical matter, OCIs are likely to be dealt
with as issues of contractor qualification anyway. As Table 1 reflects, the proposed rule would

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF KEY ELEMENTS OF DRAFT FAR ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST (OCI) RULE

Threat:
Required CO
early assessment
(3.1206-1), case
by case (3.1206-2),
in evaluation process (3.1206-3),
and award
(3.1206-4):

CO discretion:

OCI: Contractor May
Distort Competition
(“Biased Ground
Rules”)

OCI: Potentially Biased Contractor Advice
(“Impaired Objectivity”)

Unequal Access to Information
(no longer OCI)

Impair integrity of competitive process

Risk that Government’s business interests
impaired

Contractor may misuse non-public
information, or use for unfair competitive advantage

If OCI risk is an evaluation factor,
communications that could result in
changes to mitigation plan constitute
discussions
OCI risk may instead be part of
;
may withhold award because of OCI
only after allowing offeror to respond
(3.1206-4)

CO must require agency
to produce list of support contractors that
etc. (3.1206-2); CO
should not rely solely
on offerors’ information
(3.1206-3)
CO
take action to
substantially reduce or
eliminate risk (3.1203(b)
(2))

CO has broad discretion, and may accept
risk (3.1203(b)(3))

To address OCIs (3.1204-1) (see required clauses, Fig. 1, below):
Avoidance
Redraft statement of work to reduce subjective judgment
Exclude offeror (only as last resort), and, if potential unfair dis-

How to address
or resolve problem:

and compliance efforts (i.e., mitigation) are enough
Neutralization
Mitigation, potentially per contractor mitigation plans (3.12063(b)), under Government oversight (3.1204-3):
(3.1204-3(c)(2)): requir-

Obtaining advice from more than one source
Determining risk is acceptable to Government (applicable
to “impaired objectivity” OCIs) (3.1204-4)
Waivers disfavored (3.1205; 3.1206-4 (best interests determination))

The Government Contractor © 2011 Thomson Reuters

CO must assess bidders’ potential
access to information; must insert
clauses and provisions (4.401-4)
(see Fig. 2)

CO must act if concludes (see
4.402-3 and -4 (steps to analysis))
that unequal access to non-public
information would give unfair
advantage
To resolve unequal access to information (4.402-4):
Dissemination by sharing
non-public information with
all,
Mitigation
(e.g., organizational or
physical separations, access
restrictions; info systems
restrictions; independent
compensation systems;
nondisclosure agreements),
subject to CO’s approval,
perhaps simply by contractor
52.204-XX, Access to Nonand/or
, if no other
means (4.402-2)

3
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Figure 1: OCIs—Required Clauses

If 52.203-XX, then:
52.203-ZZ, Disclosure of OCI
After Contract Award. Contractor
must report any new or
undisclosed OCIs; Government
may terminate for convenience.

Yes: 52.203-XX, Notice of
Potential OCI. Offerors must
assess and disclose potential
OCIs, and propose mitigation.

52.203-YY, Mitigation of OCIs, if
OCIs may be mitigated by
contractor plan, incorporated into
contract; any changes by mutual
accord; contractor must report
noncompliances.

No

52.203-YZ, Limitation on Future
Contracting, if this mitigation
strategy to be used. Covers
listed contractor and affiliates, for
fixed period.

CO determines OCIs may arise
(3.1207)?

allow COs to assess OCIs during the evaluation
process before award. The proposed rule would,
however, discourage COs from dealing with
OCIs as a technical evaluation factor, for by
doing so, a CO would risk opening discussions—
and thus risk triggering a bid protest, if those
discussions could not be held appropriately.
As a result, the proposed rule instead in effect
encourages contracting officials to assess OCIs
much like any matter of contractor qualification,
i.e., to review whether the apparent awardee
can indeed resolve any open OCI issues before
making award.
s .EW ,ABELS /LD #ATEGORIES Although the
proposed rule abandons the traditional categories of OCIs, focusing instead on OCIs that
threaten to undermine the competitive process
versus those that merely pose business risks to
the Government, as Table 1 reflects, to make
sense of these new legal categories, we really
need to superimpose the traditional three-part
taxonomy. The new nomenclature may, ultimately, only confuse things.
s 2ISK !SSESSMENTS—AND ,IKELY 4ACTICS—
#HANGED !BOUT The structure of the proposed
new rule will mean several likely tactical shifts:
s &OCUS OF #ONCERN 2EVERSED: As the discussion above reflects, over approximately the
past 15 years, GAO has focused closely on
IMPAIRED OBJECTIVITY /#)S IN PART BECAUSE
of a fear that contractors were being asked
to take on too many decision-making roles
in Government. The focus of concern under
the new rule has shifted to OCIs (tradition4

ally, the biased ground rules OCIs) that
may, in effect, corrupt the competitive process. This means that contractors will focus
first on potential conflicts that touch on the
competitive process (assisting in drafting
specifications, for example), and will worry
LESS ABOUT IMPAIRED OBJECTIVITY /#)S
s &IREWALL 2ULE 2EVERSED: The rulemakers
also abandoned GAO’s long-standing hostilITY TO lREWALLS TO MITIGATE IMPAIRED OBJECtivity OCIs. Under the new rule, firewalls
are permitted—and, indeed, the CO may
simply accept the risks posed by impaired
OBJECTIVITY /#)S
s 3PECTRE OF 0OSTAWARD #LAUSE 7ILL #HANGE
Tactics: Figure 1, below, shows the clauses
required when there is a risk of OCIs. In a
nutshell, if there is a risk of an OCI, the CO
must include a warning provision, 52.203XX, which in turn automatically triggers a
clause, 52.203-ZZ, which will require ongoing postaward disclosures. To avoid this
cascade of costs and risks, contractors will
be highly incentivized to find and resolve
OCIs as quickly as possible.
s &ORGOTTEN 3TEPSISTER—Unequal Access to
Information: Although the proposed rule
shifts the provisions regarding unequal
access to another part of the FAR, contractors are likely to look first to this legal
“pigeonhole” for solutions. If a contractor
can persuade the agency that a problem—
AN AFlLIATES ACCESS TO PROPRIETARY PROJECT
drawings, for example—is really a problem
The Government Contractor © 2011 Thomson Reuters
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Figure 2: Access to Non-Public Information—Clauses and Provisions
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of unequal access to information, and not a
full-blown OCI, the contractor will likely
be able to resolve the problem simply by
ensuring that those who have “released”
the information for use by the Government,
and those who must have “access” to the
non-public information, have endorsed the
appropriate “access” and “release” clauses
(see Figure 2). The new hierarchy of concerns will, therefore, reshape how contractors address OCIs.
s /VERALL -ODEL -ISSING One final problem
with the proposed rule is that it lacks a conceptual model, which leaves problems unanswered.
Why, for example, the volte-face: Why are risks
to the competitive process now seen as more
dangerous than biased contractor advice? The
answer likely lies buried in policymakers’ understandings and intuitions, but those themselves
can be captured by organizational models. A
principal/agent model, for example, tells us that
an agent’s (e.g., a contractor’s) conflicts of interest should cause much less concern if the agent
can be closely monitored, or faces potential sanctions for transgressing. See generally Yukins, “A
Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law
Through the Principal-Agent Model,” 40 Pub.
Cont. L.J. 63 (2010) (reviewing literature), ssrn.
com/abstract=1776295. The model suggests that
“biased advice” OCIs are viewed more benignly
The Government Contractor © 2011 Thomson Reuters

not because they are less dangerous, but because
the principal buying contractor advice is really
the agency (which can monitor a contractor’s
conflicts relatively well), while the principal assessing the integrity of the competitive process
is all interested citizens (who cannot monitor
contractors well, and so need more rigid protections). A conceptual model would thus explain
shifts in policy, and would point the way forward
for future reforms.
s (ARMONIZING /#) 2ULES WITH /THER $EVELOPMENTS )NTERNATIONALLY AND AT (OME
Finally, the proposed rule makes no effort to integrate OCIs with foreign developments, such as
the European Commission’s interest in addressing conflicts of interest, European Commission,
Green Paper on the Modernisation of EU Public
Procurement Policy—Towards a More Efficient
European Procurement Market, COM(2011) 15
final, at 49 (Brussels, 27 Jan. 2011), available at
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/
docs/2011/public_procurement/20110127_
COM_en.pdf, or with the new compliance systems that contractors are rapidly developing under the requirements of FAR 52.203-13. (There
is no reason, for example, why contractors could
not integrate OCI surveillance into a traditional
compliance system; indeed, those who must comply with contractual requirements for disclosing
/#)S ARE LIKELY TO DO JUST THAT 4O REDUCE TRANS5
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action costs and improve the effectiveness of the
regulatory regime, the rulemakers should look
to harmonize the new rule with those parallel
developments.
#ONCLUSION—As the discussion above reflects,
the proposed OCI rule marks a remarkable change
in direction, in part because policymakers’ core concerns—their core fears concerning conflicts of interest—have themselves shifted over time. Because new
means of addressing those concerns are constantly
emerging and evolving, we know that the rules will
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continue to evolve. We can hope, though, that as the
rules advance, they will mesh more seamlessly with
other advances in procurement law, both here and
abroad.

✦
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR by #HRISTOPHER 2 9UKINS,
Associate Professor of Government Contract Law
& Co-Director, Government Procurement Law
Program, The George Washington University
Law School; of counsel, Arnold & Porter LLP.
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